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A STATE SAVES A CITY:
THE NEW YORK CASE
DONNA E. SHALALA* AND CAROL BELLAMY**
In the Spring of 1975 the City of New York was unable to market
its debt. The municipal bond and note markets had closed because
of growing concern about the City's finances. More specifically, it was
discovered that the country's largest city had for more than a decade
been using questionable accounting and borrowing practices to elimi-
nate its annual budget deficits.
Underlying Causes of the Fiscal Crisis
Fiscal mismanagement was the immediate but not the fundamen-
tal cause of New York's difficulties. There are four basic reasons for
the condition of New York City's finances in 1975. They are:
1) changing population and economic characteristics;
2) national economic difficulties;
3) state and federal government action;
4) inaction and weaknesses in the political system itself.
1. Socio-Economic Factors. Like those of other large, older
northeastern and midwestern cities, New York's population and eco-
nomic activities had for almost three decades been going through a
process of realignment. The population in each of these metropolitan
areas had sorted itself out between central city and surrounding suburbs
-middle-income people went to the suburbs, lower-income people
stayed put. The middle class left in search of better schools for their
children and a piece of land they could call their own. Retail trade
followed its customers. Simultaneously, other kinds of economic activ-
ity began to shift away from the central cities. Heavy manufacturing
went to the suburbs in search of enough land to build horizontal rather
* Associate Professor of Politics, Teachers College, Columbia University; Di-
rector and Treasurer, Municipal Assistance Corporation for the City of New York.
** Member, New York State Senate; counsel to Esanu, Katsky & Korins, New
York, N.Y.
THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
MUNICIPAL AssIsTANcE CORPORATION FOR THE CITy OF NEW YORK, ANNUAL
REPORT (1976) [hereinafter cited as MAC REPORT].
1119
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
than vertical plants. Some industries relocated to the South and West
where cheap land and lower labor costs were available.'
This population and economic redistribution left New York and
other big cities with heavy concentrations of poverty. In the decade
between 1960 and 1970, New York City's poverty population (meas-
ured as a percentage of its total population) grew from one of the
lowest in the country-well below the national average-to one which
exceeded that average. 2
The implications of these economic and population shifts were
enormous. They led to significant reductions in private sector employ-
ment; in New York the number of private sector jobs decreased from
a peak of 3.8 million in 1969 to 3.4 million by the end of 1975, a
decline of more than 11 percent.3 Most importantly, however, the tax
bases of New York and other older cities slowed their growth or actu-
ally declined at precisely the time when a needy population and an
older physical plant (sanitation equipment, park facilities, etc.) re-
quired high service levels.4
2. National Economic Difficulties. The nation's economic ill-
nesses were also in part responsible for the sharp rise in the cost of
city services and welfare expenditures as well as the deterioration in
city revenues. Large cities like New York are more vulnerable to
economic downturns because, unlike other municipalities which rely
primarily on property taxes for their revenue, New York relies more
heavily on sales and income taxes which tend to be more susceptible
to cyclical variations.5 In addition to the impact of the recession on
the tax base, the effects of the national economic downturn are clearly
revealed in high unemployment figures. The only up-to-date measure
of central city economic activity available is the unemployment rate.
One study of New York's unemployment patterns over time concluded
that during the 1970s, "it is reasonable to assume that the New York
1. These trends are analyzed in detail in Blaydon & Gilford, Financing the Cities:
An Issue Agenda, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1057.
2, STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., 94TH CONG., lST SEss., NEW YORK CITY'S
FINANCIAL CRISIS: AN EVALUATION OF ITS ECONOMIC IMPACT AND OF PROPOSED POLICY
SOLUTIONS 15-16 (Comm. Print 1975).
3. R. BAHL & A. CAMPBELL, TFIF ECONOMIC AND FISCAL OUTLOOK FOR NEW YORK
CITY 2 (March 24, 1976) (study presented to the Mediation Panel for the Negotiations
between the MTA and the TWU, New York City).
4. See Blaydon & Gilford, supra note 1, at 1079-89.
5. A. OTr & J. Yoo, NEW YORK CITY'S FINANCIAL CRISIS 14 (American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, Domestic Affairs Study No. 40, 1975).
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economy has been more seriously affected by the recession than the
economies of most other large central cities."'
However, the economic problems of New York City are not transi-
tory; the recession intensified them, to be sure, but it provides only a
partial explanation. At least one analysis of the City's economic base
suggests that even a national recovery may not be a panacea.' The
impact of federal investment of tax dollars in the South and West pro-
vides another partial explanation; 8 the resulting shift in the location of
economic activity has left New York's economic base in deeper trouble
than before. Bahl and Campbell provide additional explanations,
including the high cost characteristics of the New York area. They
write:
These high costs are produced by a variety of factors related to wage
levels, congestion, energy costs, and higher taxes. It is also suggested
by some that a lack of land availability causes companies looking to ex-
pand or to relocate, to move beyond the city limits and more and more
frequently beyond the region. And to the extent that social needs of the
City residents have contributed to this declining base, the situation is
reinforcing since the job losses further deplete the revenues of the City
while not reducing proportionately the need for public services. 9
3. State and Federal Policies. The fact that the City performs
so many functions is not only a matter of taste or choice. No other
large city in this country has as many services assigned to it as the City
of New York. In addition to normal housekeeping functions-police,
fire, and sanitation-New York operates hospitals, elementary, second-
ary and higher education facilities, and subsidizes health care and mass
transportation.'" Unlike other cities, New York must bear twenty-five
percent of its welfare costs and fifty percent of the expenses of home
relief programs mandated by the state constitution.1
State government is responsible for -this heavy burden of functional
assignments. The conspicuous failure of state government either to
expand the boundaries of the City to include the newly developed
middle-income suburbs or to provide enough aid to offset the loss in
tax revenues has contributed to the City's current crisis. There has,
however, been an increase in state aid to the City. The City of New
6. NEw YORK CITY's FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 2, at 21.
7. A. OTT & J. Yoo, supra note 5, at 16.
8. The dimensions of this shift are a matter of some controversy. See Blaydon
& Gilford, supra note 1, at 1106-07.
9. R. BAHL & A. CAMPBELL, supra note 3, at 6.
10. See MAC REPORT 7.
11. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 154 (McKinney 1976).
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York has received an increase in total aid from the state of more than
600 percent since 1969, compared to 300 percent for the rest of the
state. However, half of this increase was for state-mandated welfare
programs; when welfare aid is excluded, the City still receives less aid
per person than the rest of the state of New York.12
While the City's powers and responsibilities are determined by the
state, the federal government must also bear part of the blame. Fed-
eral program mandates of the 1960s fell most heavily on those local
jurisdictions whose education, health and welfare programs received
the most substantial federal aid. In addition, the federal government
made it easier for middle and upper income families to move to suburbs
by providing FHA and GI loans, and by the construction of federally
financed highways.'
New York City itself probably tried to do too much for too many.
It tried to use public employment programs as a vehicle for the redistribu-
tion of income. Whether it is theoretically proper for a city government
to become the employer of last resort is questionable; the fact is that
New York City made such a policy determination in order to fill the
vacuum left by all other levels of government, especially the federal
government.14
4. Political Explanations. New York's elected officials also
found it difficult to say "no." To a political scientist observing the
City's government over the last decade, it seemed as if the trade-off
mechanism of the political process had broken down. The City's lead-
ers seemed to respond to most groups by saying "yes" without demand-
ing quid pro quo. They failed to alternate or compromise the specific
demands of various interests. The nature of the political process and
the necessity for re-election every four years reinforced this style. The
political process is characterized by incrementalism, i.e., a policy of tak-
ing small steps. Incrementalism applied to the budget means that last
year's budget is the best indicator of how this year's budget should be
drafted. When the new budget is put together, increases are simply
tacked on to existing programs; there is no questioning of whether exist-
ing programs are still useful.
The important point is that politicians do not take bold risks.
They take small steps. They simply add to what has been done previ-
12. See Shalala, State Aid to Local Government, in GOVERNING NEW YORK STATE:
THE ROCKEFELLER YEARS 100 (R. Connery & G. Benjamin eds. 1974). Calculations
are based on newer data from recent state budgets.
13. See Campbell & Shalala, Problems Unsolved, Solutions Untried: The Urban
Crisis, in THE STATES AND THE URBAN CRISIS 13 (A. Campbell ed. 1970).
14. See MAC REPORT 7.
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ously rather than re-analyze or reorganize what already exists. Such
myopic behavior is inconsistent with long-term fiscal planning; it does
not even recognize a pattern of economic decline. The myopia of the
political hierarchy went largely unchecked during the 1960s because
of the muted role taken by some interest groups in that decade. New
York's civic groups, the media and the academic community failed to
watch the City's finances very carefully. It is in the nature of the pub-
lic finance system to frighten off all but the most stalwart; the City's
outside protectors trusted the government's experts. Indeed, unlike
other cities, New York had most of the skilled budget experts on its
payroll. The predictable result was a dearth of discussion about a
growing fiscal crisis.
Deficit Planning
When economic activity shifts away from central cities without a
compensating reduction in the cities' financial or service responsibili-
ties, service costs inevitably increase more rapidly than the revenue to
support them. Budget deficits are thus created. To close such gaps,
most older large cities have four alternatives: 1) cutting services; 2)
raising taxes; 3) convincing their states, and the federal government,
to give them more aid or to take over the entire cost and/or adminis-
tration of particular services; or 4) undertaking governmental reor-
ganization.
The final alternative-reorganizing the local government system
by stretching the boundaries of a city to include its surrounding
suburbs, thereby giving the city access to the stronger tax base of its
suburbs-faces strong political obstacles. There has been one regional
exception, the South, and in a few areas some single-function metro-
politan or regional districts have been created.15  For most older
American cities (particularly those located in the Northeast and the
Midwest), every year since the late 1950s has seen a new budget
deficit that had to be closed by either raising taxes, increased inter-
governmental aid, or introducing service cuts. The single exception
was the City of New York, which found other sources of money.
Borrowing-A New Current Revenue
New Yorkers have, of course, felt the sting of increased taxes, the
relief of increased state and federal aid, and some decrease in services.
But the City also used various borrowing and accounting techniques to
15. See Blaydon & Gilford, supra note 1, at 1091-92.
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finance its annual budget deficits. Many of these were authorized by
the state legislature, and depended on the "peculiarities and permissive-
ness of the City's accounting procedures"; their use assumed that the
"growing City debt was marketable in ever increasing volume."' 6 The
City underestimated expenses and overestimated revenues through an
accounting system that often treated expenses on a cash basis and
revenues on an accrual basis. It used the capital budget to finance
expense items, and used an out-of-date actuarial base for municipal
employee pension fund contributions which understated the true cost
of the pensions. But the principal technique employed by the City
was the use of short-term borrowing to finance current operating ex-
penses.' 7
It was the misuse of borrowing that distinguished New York from
the other cities and was the fundamental cause of the City's most recent
crisis. Borrowing is not new to local governments. Every local govern-
ment does it, for two purposes: long-term financing and cash flow.
Long-term borrowing is capital borrowing-bonding. 8 The second
kind of borrowing, done for cash-flow purposes, is short-term or
seasonal borrowing-issuing notes.' Two short-term borrowing tech-
niques were used by the City of New York for its expense budget. The
first was the utilization of tax anticipation notes (TANS), which were
issued in anticipation of property taxes. The second was the issuance
of revenue anticipation notes (RANS) sold in anticipation of all other
sources of revenue.
The immediate cause of New York City's 1975 fiscal crisis was
its misuse of both bonds and notes. Basically, the City used long- and
short-term borrowing to erase its annual budget shortfall. It borrowed
in increased amounts against accrued (but in fact uncollectable) tax
revenues, and shifted payment dates for payrolls and other expenses
forward to future fiscal years. In addition, the City used long-term
debt to finance such non-capital programs as manpower training and
16. MAC REPORT 7.
17. See id.
18. "Bonds are long-term obligations, maturing in not less than one year. Sold pri-
marily to finance long-term capital investments, bonds have traditionally comprised the
bulk of state and local government financing, although this pattern has altered over the
past decade." Forbes & Petersen, Background Paper to BUILDING A BROADER MARKET:
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE MUNICIPAL BOND MAR-
KET 38 (1976).
19. "Notes are short-term obligations with a maximum maturity of one year or less.
Notes are customarily used to smooth out the differences in cash flow between revenues
and expenditures, to meet unexpected deficits, or to provide interim financing of projects
in anticipation of later bond sales." Id.
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vocational education and to pay an increasing array of other recurring
expenses, thereby shifting many expense items to its capital budget.
Thus the City was able to present the appearance of having balanced
its budget.20  In fact, such actions were effectively creating permanent
additions to the City's outstanding debt. Once it became ensnarled
in this labyrinthine system, the City had to continue to borrow in
order to pay off previous debts and to finance new deficits.
21
One other complex fiscal maneuver added to the City's borrowing
needs: the use of bond anticipation notes (BANS). While it waited
for an unpredictable market to offer lower interest rates on long-term
bonds to finance its middle-income housing program, the City issued
relatively low interest notes. The projects were built, but the market
never went down so that bonds could be floated. In an effort to mini-
mize interest costs passed through to housing companies and tenants,
the City never converted the notes issued for subsidized housing
(Mitchell-Lama) to long-term bonds or federally insured mortgages.
Instead, it continued to "roll over," or refinance, the short-term debt
issued for that purpose.22
With the discovery of these borrowing techniques the City had
found an apparently inexhaustible source of revenue, one that did not
require begging at the doors of other unfriendly governments (state
and/or federal) or generating the ire of local citizens by tax increases
or spending cuts. It was a seemingly "perfect revenue." Indeed, by
20. See MAC REPORT 7; A. OTr & J. Yoo, supra note 5, at 2-7.
21. The following table, reprinted from MAC REPORT, at 8, illustrates the quantity
and types of borrowing undertaken by the City in the five years immediately preceding
its fiscal crisis:
New York City Balance Sheet Items
(Fiscal Years Ending June 30)
($ Millions)
Change
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1970-75
Short-term Debt
Budget Notes - 308 461 308 308 - -
Tax Anticipation Notes 170 206 232 265 317 380 + 210
Revenue Anticipation Notes 537 1,096 1,180 887 1,798 2,560 +2,023
Bond Anticipation Notes
(Including Notes for
Limited Profit Housing) 468 587 688 957 909 1,570 + 1,103
Urban Renewal Notes 55 94 86 94 84 30 - 25
Total Short-term 1,229 2,291 2,647 2,511 3,416 4,540 +3,311
Long-term Debt
(Net of Sinking Fund Assets) 4,361 4,714 5,515 6,007 6,734 6,798 +2,437
Grand Total 5,590 7,005 8,162 8,519 10,150 11,338 +5,748
22. See id. at 7; A. OT & J. Yoo, supra note 5, at 6.
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the beginning of fiscal year 1976 the City expected to borrow over nine
billion dollars:
a) almost $2 billion in the bond market to cover its capital facili-
ties commitments, along with more than $700 million to support
operating expenses;
b) funds to refinance or "roll over" $1.2 billion in Mitchell-
Lama bond anticipation notes (BANS);
c) $1.5 billion in notes for normal cash flow and seasonal
borrowing purposes;
d) $3 billion in notes to refinance the notes issued to cover the
deficit accumulated over the decade;
e) $1 billion in new notes to finance the 1976 fiscal year deficit.
If the City had been able to borrow these amounts, it would have issued
over $500 million in notes per month and more than $500 million in
bonds per quarter.23
Changes in the Market for Municipal Debt
The effective closing of the municipal debt market because of the
discovery that the City had misused its borrowing power unfortunately
coincided with other market changes. A number of factors, including
the recession, made 1975 a highly competitive year for municipal
bonds. Short-term borrowing had quadrupled in eight years while
long-term debt had doubled.24 This meant that New York had more
competition from other municipalities than ever before. Just as
important, bond customers had changed dramatically during this period.
A recent congressional study reported that since 1970 there has been
a decline in the proportion of the market represented by the commer-
23. See NEw YORK Crri's FISCAL PROBLEM: ITS ORIGINS, POTENTIAL REPERCUS-
SIONS, AND SOME ALTERNATIVE POLICY RESPONSES (Congressional Budget Office Back-
ground Paper No. 1, 1975) reprinted in Congressional Budget Office Oversight, Hearings
Before the House Comm. on the Budget, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, at 50-51 (1976).
24. See id. at 54 (Tables 1 & 2):
VOLUME OF MUNICIPAL BORROWING
(Amounts are par values in millions of dollars)
Year Long-term Short-term Total
1967 14,300 8,000 22,300
1968 16,300 86O0 24,900
1969 11,700 11,700 23,400
1970 18,888 17,811 35,999
1971 25,006 26,259 51,265
1972 23,748 24,705 49,018
1973 23,957 24,705 48,662
1974 24,317 29,543 53,860
1975* 30,124 33,932 64,056
* Annual rate based on January-June volume.
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cial banks. 25  This was a particular problem for the short-term market,
in which the large commercial banks played a major role. There were
many reasons for their reduced interest in bonds. A major factor was
their diminished need for tax-exempt bonds because of setbacks they
had suffered in their real estate ventures. Indeed, the need for greater
liquidity in their portfolios was forcing them to diversify their holdings.
The Solutions
Faced with imminent default on its debt, the City turned to the
state for assistance. The state had legal responsibility for all local juris-
dictions; their powers, after all, were totally derived from the state.26
New York State's options were limited by legal, political and time con-
straints. Neither formal bankruptcy nor default was seriously consid-
ered as an alternative by policymakers in early 1975. Instead, the state
reviewed four approaches: 1) increasing aid; 2) directly assuming the
cost of selected city services; 3) increasing taxes; 4) resorting to
borrowing itself to cover the City's bad debts.
The Creation of "MAC"
Despite the absence of any existing New York legislation to deal
with this financial emergency, the state assumed a significant measure
of responsibility. First, the City was advanced $800 million in state
aid. Second, on June 10, 1975, the legislature established the Munici-
pal Assistance Corporation for the City of New York (MAC). 27 MAC,
ANNUAL NET CHANGES IN HOLDINGS OF MUNICIPAL SECURITIES BY
MAJOR HOLDER GROUPS (1970-1975)
(Amounts are par values in billions of dollars)
Holder 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975*
First Second
Quarter Quarter
Commercial banks 10.7 12.6 7.2 5.7 5.5 -2.7 6.9
Households -. 8 -. 2 1.0 4.3 10.0 13.9 9.3
All other** 1.3 5.2 6.2 3.7 1.9 2.9 4.5
Total 11.2 17.6 14.4 13.7 17.4 14.0 20.7
* Annual rate.
** This includes corporate business, state and local general funds, mutual savings
banks, insurance companies, state and local government retirement funds, and
brokers and dealers.
25. Id.
26. For a general discussion of the City-state relationship, see Macchiarola, The
State and the City, in GOVERNING NEw YORK STATE: THE ROCKEFELLER YEARS (R. Con-
nery & G. Benjamin eds. 1974).
27. N.Y. PUB. AuTm. LAw §§ 3030-40 (McKinney 1970-75 Cum. Supp.). The his-
tory and function of MAC are reviewed in detail in MAC REPORT 11-19.
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a public benefit corporation, was to serve as an interim borrowing
agency for the City. Its major responsibility was to transform the City's
short-term debt into long-term obligations. Specifically, MAC was
authorized to borrow $3 billion by issuing long-term obligations to
refund the City's maturing short-term debt and to pay some of the City's
operating expenses. MAC bonds were backed by a four percent state
sales tax levied only in the City, and the stock transfer tax. In the past,
both of these taxes had been levied by or paid to the City. The MAC
legislation also required the City to institute certain accounting reforms
and set limits on the amount of short-term indebtedness the City could
incur.
MAC is administered by a nine-member Board of Directors. All
the directors are appointed by the Governor with the advice and con-
sent of the State Senate; four directors are appointed upon written
recommendation of the Mayor. The MAC legislation also provides for
the appointment of non-voting representatives to the Board by the State
Comptroller and certain state and city officials and legislators.
Since City securities were unmarketable, it was hoped that MAC
bonds would be viewed as sufficiently stronger and different to attract
potential buyers. Three factors reinforced this hope: 1) MAC bonds
were being issued by a state agency and carried with them the "moral
obligation" of the state to meet any shortfall in debt service; 2) the
sales and transfer tax revenues were to be diverted directly to MAC
to cover its debt service costs; 3) the City was finally beginning to
reform itself, and MAC was specifically charged with monitoring efforts
to change the City's accounting system. In spite of these assurances,
as well as initial nine and one-half and subsequent eleven percent
interest rates, by August of 1975 MAC was also unable to market its
bonds publicly. Faced again with the prospect of the City's default and
an investment community reluctant to buy any other New York securi-
ties, the Governor instructed MAC to draft a rescue program. 28
That program, enacted in the fall of 1975 during two special
sessions of the legislature, had two dimensions-governmental and fiscal.
The governance plan eliminated the last vestiges of fiscal home rule
from the City. It placed in the hands of elected and appointed state
officials the fiscal management of the City of New York. The New
York State Financial Emergency Act for the City of New York29 estab-
lished the Emergency Financial Control Board (Control Board) to
28. See MAC REPoRT 11.
29. N.Y. Laws 1975, ch. 868-70 (McKinney).
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review and supervise the financial management of the City and to con-
trol the disbursement of City monies. The legislation provided for the
appointment of a Special Deputy State Comptroller to assist the new
Control Board in carrying out its responsibilities. A Financial Plan of
the City's projected revenues and expenditures for the fiscal years end-
ing on June 30, 1976, 1977 and 1978 was also required. The intent
of the Financial Plan is to bring the City's expense budget into balance
by June 30, 1978.
A key element of the legislation is the Control Board. State-
dominated, it is composed of the Governor, the Mayor, City and State
Comptrollers, and three appointees of the Governor. Its functions and
powers, in addition to approving the three-year Financial Plan, are sig-
nificant. They include the power to estimate revenues and expendi-
tures, to approve major contracts and all borrowing, to extend (if neces-
sary) the freeze on the number of City employees through fiscal year
1978, and to disburse City revenues only after it is satisfied that the
expenditures are consistent with the Financial Plan. The powers of
the Control Board also extend to the so-called Covered Organizations-
the City's semi-independent agencies which provide elementary and
secondary education, higher education, hospitals and other services.
One significant power was intentionally left to the Mayor-the author-
ity to determine spending priorities within the overall revenue limits
imposed by the Control Board. 0 The existence of the Control Board
terminates six months after it finds that the City's Expense Budget has
been in balance for one fiscal year in accordance with the principles
of a Uniform System of Accounts.
In November of 1975 the second phase of the rescue program was
enacted by the state legislature and Congress. At the state level, a
financing plan was developed which included increased City taxes31
and a $2.5 billion commitment from the five City pension funds to buy
MAC or City obligations.32 There were other, smaller commitments
from the four City sinking funds and several major banks. The most
controversial part of the plan-the New York City Emergency Mora-
torium Act 33-was enacted by the state legislature on November 15,
1975. In the legislative findings accompanying the Moratorium Act,
the legislature concluded that there was
imminent danger that the city of New York will be unable to pay its
outstanding short-term indebtedness and even to provide those basic ser-
30. Id. ch. 868, § 4.
31. Id. ch. 881 et seq.
32. See MAC REPORT 15.
33. N.Y. Laws 1975, ch. 874 (McKinney), as amended by id. ch. 875.
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vices essential to the health, safety and welfare of its inhabitants and
the continuation of orderly government in the city. The legislature
recognizes and insists that the pledge of the "faith and credit" of the
city to the payment of its obligations must be respected. The legislature
further recognizes that in the current financial crisis, this pledge can be
honored only if the viability and resources of the city are preserved and
that the continuation of essential services is vital to such preservation.
The preservation of the city, the honoring of its obligations and restora-
tion of public confidence in the agencies of the state and of the state itself
are all matters of imperative state concern and require the extraordinary
exercise of the state's essential reserve and emergency powers set out
in the Act to protect the vital interests of the people by sustaining the
public credit and maintaining local government.34
The Moratorium Act provides that during the "moratorium
period" the enforcement of short-term obligations of the City outstand-
ing on November 15, 1975, is suspended, notwithstanding the stated
maturity of such obligations. After the stated maturity, such obligations
will bear interest at a rate of not less than six percent a year. The
moratorium only bars actions by noteholders who have been given an
opportunity to exchange their notes for longer-term MAC bonds, and
have declined to do so. The Moratorium Act does not apply to City
bonds. The moratorium period expires on November 15, 1978, three
years from the effective date of the Act, but it may be shortened by
the legislature or extended by amendment to the Moratorium Act itself.
At the time it enacted the Moratorium Act, the legislature also
increased the authorized borrowing capacity of MAC to $5 billion, and
made state per capita aid payments available to the City for the pay-
ment of MAC bonds.35 Since that time, MAC has made two exchange
offers to holders of certain City obligations.3"
34. Id.
35. N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAw §§ 3033, 3036-a (McKinney Supp. 1976).
36. In late 1975, legal actions were commenced contesting the validity of the Mora-
torium Act under the United States and New York Constitutions. On November 19,
1976, the New York Court of Appeals declared the year-old moratorium unconstitu-
tional, reversing two lower court decisions. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance
Corp., 40 NY.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). The court based its
decision upon article VIII, § 2 of the New York Constitution, which forbids a city
from issuing debt securities unless it has "pledged its faith and credit for payment of
the principal thereof and the interest thereon." Id. at 734, 358 N.E.2d at 851, 390
N.Y.S.2d at 25. Reasoning from the meaning of the words "full faith and credit"
and the constitutional provisions allowing municipalities to exceed maximum tax rates
to provide debt service, Chief Judge Breitel found a "constitutional imperative" that
"debt obligations . . . be paid, even if tax limits be exceeded." Id. at 737, 358 N.E.2d
at 852, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 27. The court rejected the assertion that the "emergency"
status of the City might mandate a different holding on the binding nature of the
"full faith and credit" pledge:
Emergencies and the police power, although they may modify their ap-
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The final piece of the financing plan was put in place on
December 15, 1975, when the President of the United States signed
the New York City Seasonal Financing Act.17 This legislation provided
funds so that the City could meet its seasonal financial needs, which
vary because of differences in timing between the payment of expend-
itures and the receipt of revenues. To implement the Seasonal
Financing Act, the City, the State, the Control Board and the United
States entered into a Credit Agreement, dated December 30, 1975,
pursuant to which the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to make
short-term loans to the City. 8 The principal amount of all such loans
outstanding at any one time cannot exceed $2.3 billion. Among the
conditions that must be satisfied before any seasonal loans may be made
is a determination by the Secretary that there is a reasonable prospect
of repayment in accordance with the terms of the loan.
Default Legislation
Concerned about the dearth of federal legislative provisions for
municipal default, the New York State legislature also adopted certain
amendments to the Local Finance Law, applicable to the City during
its emergency period. 9 Under the new law, a defaulting municipality
or, if it refuses, its emergency financial control board, may file a
voluntary petition in the state supreme court. The petition must state
that the municipality is unable to meet its debts as they come due, and
that the municipality or its control board intends to file a repayment
plications, do not suspend constitutional principles. It is not merely a matter
of application to interpret the words of the Constitution and obligations is-
sued subject to the Constitution to mean exactly the opposite of what they
say. The notes in suit provided that the city pledged its full faith and credit
to pay the notes and to pay them punctually when due. The clause and the
constitutional mandate have no office except when their enforcement is in-
convenient. Id. at 740-41, 358 N.E.2d at 855, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
Despite its treatment of the merits, the court ruled that the holders of City's notes were
not entitled to any immediate payments if such a remedy would be "unnecessarily dis-
ruptive of the city's delicate financial and economic balance." Id. at 741, 358 N.E.2d
at 855, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 29. Government, business and union leaders were thus thrust
together again to devise a new refinancing plan.
On February 8, 1977, the Court of Appeals ordered the City to pay the claims of
the Flushing plaintiffs on a six-month timetable. The court remanded the case to a
specially appointed justice of the state Supreme Court, who is to "preside over all
aspects of [the] matter." The presiding justice is to oversee the payment of claims
under a plan which divides creditors into three classes and gives private note-holders
preference over corporations and institutions. New York City Given 6-Month Schedule
by State Court to Pay $1 Billion of Notes, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1977, at 33, cols. 1-2.
37. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-10 (1976).
38. The principal provisions of the Credit Agreement are summarized in Oversight
on the New York City Seasonal Financing Act, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1976) (statement of
Treasury Secretary Simon).
39. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAw §§ 85.00-.90 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
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plan with the court detailing the nature and amount of the obligations
which may be affected and, insofar as is practicable, the names and
addresses of creditors who may be affected by the plan. The filing
of the petition automatically prohibits for ninety days the doing of any
act, and stays any pending action, "seeking to apply or enforce against
the municipality ...any order, judgment, lien, set-off or counter-
claim . ... 40
The Act further provides that, upon the filing of such a petition,
a Repayment Plan may be filed by the municipality or, in the event
the municipality refuses to file such a Plan, by its control board. Upon
the filing of the Repayment Plan, the court is to enter an order approv-
ing the Repayment Plan with respect to those creditors who accept the
Plan or any benefits thereunder, if the court finds generally that the
plan (i) provides for eventual satisfaction of City obligations; (ii) gives
equitable and prompt payment; (iii) preserves priorities among credi-
tors; and (iv) was approved by the Control Board. 1 With the court's
approval, the Plan may be modified by the municipality or its control
board, if circumstances warrant such a modification.42
Conclusion
What is remarkable about New York State's actions during New
York City's 1975 fiscal crisis is how easily traditional constraints to
governmental action were overcome. First, fiscal home rule, long the
battle cry of every big-city mayor, was given up with barely a whimper
from the City of New York. Second, through action at the state level,
the incremental political process which was in part responsible for the
accumulated deficit was successfully abandoned to solve the crisis.
The steps which were taken-particularly the Financial Emergency Act
and the moratorium legislation-were not incremental; they were bold,
innovative legislation. Third, there were serious efforts to preserve the
democratic process. The Control Board legislation was carefully
worded to leave spending priorities in the hands of the City's elected
officials. Bankruptcy was avoided in part because of the strong belief
that elected and not appointed officials ought to put the City's fiscal
matters in order.
40. Id. § 85.30.
41. Id. § 85.40.
42. Id. § 85.60. New York state's default legislation resembles in many respects
the new federal provisions for municipal insolvency, which went into effect on April 9,
1976. Act to Amend Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat.
315 et seq., amending 11 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970). For an exposition of the federal
act, see King, Municipal Insolvency: The New Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act,
1976 Duuu L.. 1157.
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